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An important companion to a study of how corporations have issued and
investors have purchased debt and equity securities during the past half
century is an examination of how these securities have been priced in this
interval. Both resource utilization and inflation have varied widely in the
American economy, causing sharp changes in security prices and thus
enormously diverse ex post returns on corporate equities and bonds.
Even if we limit ourselves to the post-Accord (1951) years, the variation
in returns is huge. To illustrate, equities earned positive real returns in
1954, 1958, and 1975 of 54%, 41%, and 30%, respectively, but had
— 24% and — 38% returns in 1973 and 1974. Variations in real returns on
high-quality corporate bonds were smaller, but in the double-digit range
nonetheless (14% in 1970 and 1976 and -13% to -16% in 1969, 1974,
1979, and 1980). The primary purpose of this study is to increase our
understanding of the determinants of these variations.
The study is divided into four broad parts. We begin with an explora-
tory analysis of the data for the 1926-80 period. It makes good analytical
sense to examine the data for any regularities without the imposition of
too much structure before studying the data in the confines of a particular
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model. In section 3.2, we estimate the relationships between one-month
ex post returns on corporate bonds and equities and variations in Trea-
sury bill rates, economic activity, and other variables. The major other
variable is unanticipated changes in new issue coupon rates on long-term
Treasury bonds. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 contain econometric investigations
of the determinants of one-month Treasury bill rates and unanticipated
changes in long-term Treasury coupon rates, respectively. These parts
perform two functions: they extend the analysis of section 3.2 by explain-
ing variables that determine ex post corporate bond and equity returns,
and they provide evidence on the determination of new issue yields on
short- and long-term default-free debt. The first part of the study differs
from the others in that it consists of simple numerical analysis (plots,
calculation of means, etc.) rather than formal econometrics, and consid-
ers data from the entire 1926-80 period rather than the 1953-80 span.
A number of important issues are addressed in the econometric parts
of the paper. These include the validity of the Modigliani-Cohn valua-
tion-error hypothesis, the measurement of Merton's "excess return on
the market," the relationship between real new-issue debt rates and real
economic activity, and the usefulness of the Livingston survey data in
explaining financial returns.
Three general datasets are analyzed. First, the ex post returns on bills,
bonds, and equities are those compiled by Ibbotson and Sinquefield
(1980); causality tests of relationship among these returns and inflation
are reported in Appendix A. Second, changes in the coupon rate on
long-term, new-issue-equivalent Treasury bonds and unanticipated
changes in this rate are based upon the work of Huston McCulloch and
are described in Appendix B. Third, unanticipated inflation and indus-
trial production growth are derived from the Livingston survey data, and
they and the entire semiannual dataset utilized in the analysis of unantici-
pated changes in new-issue coupon rates are presented in Appendix C.
3.1 Exploratory Data Analysis
This part of the study contains sections dealing with (1) inflation and
Treasury bill rates; (2) inflation and relative returns on equities, bonds,
and bills; and (3) the business cycle and returns on equities and bonds.
Before turning to the analysis, a few words about the data are in order.
First, all of the underlying yield data compiled by Ibbotson and Sinque-
field—equities, corporate bonds, Treasury bonds, and Treasury bills—
are roughly representative of returns on economy-wide "market" port-
folios and are available monthly for the 1926-80 period. These yields are
realized, rather than expected, returns, except for those on Treasury bills
which are both expected and realized because their one-month maturity
equals the period over which the returns are calculated. Second, the119 Debt and Equity Yields, 1926-1980
returns—income plus capital gains (except for bills)—are before-tax
returns. They are not truly representative of what either highly taxed or
tax-exempt investors actually earned after tax (both investor groups
presumably would have opted for portfolios with relative income and
capital gains components different from the market average, and the
former group, of course, paid taxes). Hopefully, differential returns, at
least, are roughly representative of those earned by most investors.
The inflation rate is the rate of change in the consumer price index for
the 1926-46 period and the rate of change in the consumer price index net
of the shelter component after 1946. The latter circumvents the er-
roneous treatment of housing costs (especially mortgage interest) in the
construction of the basic CPI (see Blinder 1980; Dougherty and Van
Order 1982).
3.1.1 Inflation and Treasury Bill Returns
During the 1926-80 period there was a single episode of significant
deflation, 1930-32. In those three years the inflation rate ranged from
-6% to -10%. Modest deflation also occurred in 1926-27, 1938, and
1949. In contrast, there have been three significant bursts of inflation—
the beginning of World War II (9% in 1941 and 1942), the postwar surge
(18% in 1946 and 9% in 1947), and the Korean War scare (6% in 1950 and
1951)—and the prolonged post-1967 inflationary era. The current infla-
tion has ranged from slightly over 4% (adjusting for the impact of price
controls in 1971-72) to double-digit inflation in 1974 and again in 1979-
80.
The above overview of the 1926-80 period suggests that division of
these years into four subperiods might be useful. These are 1926-40
(which includes the Depression and all years of even modest deflation
except 1949), 1941-51 (which includes the inflationary spurts of World
War II, its aftermath, and the outbreak of the Korean conflict), 1952-67
(the era of stable prices), and 1968-80 (the present inflationary period).
The first two columns of table 3.1 present the mean and standard devia-
tions for the annual inflation rate for these and overlapping periods. The
great differences in the mean inflation rate and its variability are obvious.
The next four columns list means and standard deviations for both the
nominal and real one-month Treasury bill rate. As can be seen, there is
an enormous difference in the variability of the real bill rate between
1926-51 and 1952-80. In the latter period the standard deviation of the
real bill rate, 1.5%, is only three-fifths of that of the nominal bill rate,
2.6%; in the earlier period, the former, 6.4%, is over five times the latter,
1.2%. Division of the earlier interval into 1926-40 and 1941-51 reveals
enormous variability in the real bill rate (and stability in the nominal
rate). The mean real bill rate was a full 2.8% in 1926-40 and an incredible
-5.4% in 1941-51. The negative real rate in the 1940s was due to the120 Patric H. Hendershott/Roger D. Huang





















































Note: The real bill rate is the nominal rate less the inflation rate. Annual rates are geometric
averages of the 12 monthly rates during calendar years.
monetary authorities' policy of pegging nominal interest rates at low
levels during a period of significant inflation. The high real rate in the
1930s is largely attributable to the combination of the general nonnegativ-
ity constraint on the nominal rate and the existence of significant defla-
tion. However, it is noteworthy that the real bill rate exceeded 4% in all
years in the 1926-30 period during which the nonnegativity constraint
was not binding (the nominal bill rate ranged from 2.4% to 4.7%).
Figure 3.1 illustrates the marked difference between the 1926-51 and
1952-80 periods in the volatility of both the nominal and real bill rates. In
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Fig. 3.1 Real and nominal Treasury bill rates, 1926-80.121 Debt and Equity Yields, 1926-1980
flat; in the latter period this rate cycles around a sharply rising trend (the
1980 average bill rate of almost 12% disguises variations in monthly rates
between less than 7% and over 16%). In contrast, the real bill rate varied
between +12% in 1931 and 1932 and -18% in 1946. Its often-cited
stability clearly refers to the post-1951 period only.
1
3.1.2 Inflation and Relative Returns on Equities, Bonds, and Bills
The first two columns in table 3.2 repeat the same columns in table 3.1.
The third and fourth columns record the mean and standard deviation of
the difference between the annual returns on equities and corporate
bonds. As can be seen, the premiums equities have earned over bonds
have varied widely. The premium was much greater in the 1940s, 1950s,
and 1960s than in the 1930s and 1970s.
2 It would appear from these data
that there is no simple relationship between the premium and either the
mean or the standard deviation of the inflation rate.
3
The last two columns in table 3.2 report the mean standard deviation of
the difference between the annual returns earned on U.S. government
bonds and one-month bills. The difference was extraordinarily large,
3.8%, in the 1926-40 period, and small, -2.5%, in the 1968-80 period.
These differences are due to apparently unanticipated movements in
interest rates.
4 To illustrate, if yields fall unexpectedly, then prices of
long-term bonds will rise unexpectedly, and the one-year return on bonds
will be large. This was apparently the case in the 1930s (the one-month
bill rate declined from an average of over 3.0% in 1926-30 to less than
0.5% in the 1933-40 period). In contrast, if yields rise unexpectedly, then
prices of long-term bonds will fall unexpectedly, and the one-year return
on bonds will be low. This apparently has happened in the post-1952
period (the one-month bill rate rose from 1.5% in 1952-55 to 5% in
1967-69 to over 10% in 1979-80) .
5
It is important to note that only unanticipated movements in interest
rates have such impacts on the difference in realized returns on bonds and
bills. For example, if long-term bond rates were expected to rise during
the year, then bonds would be priced at the beginning of the year such
Table 3.2 Annual Inflation and the Returns on Equities (Relative to Bonds)
and Bonds (Relative to Bills)
Corporate Treasury
Inflation Equities Bonds
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that a high income return would offset the anticipated capital loss. In this
case, the difference in ex post returns on bonds and bills would be
independent of observed changes in new-issue bond yields.
3.1.3 The Business Cycle and Returns on Equities and Treasury Bonds
In this section, we explore the presence of a business cycle effect on
returns earned on investment in corporate bonds and stocks. The refer-
ence dates of the National Bureau of Economic Research are employed
as a general guide to the stages of the business cycle. In the 1926-80
period, KM cycles have occurred (see table 3.3). Excluding the 43-month
depression, contractions have ranged from 6 to 16 months and have had
an average duration of 11 months. Excluding the 80- and 106-month
wartime (World War II and Viet Nam) expansions, upswings have varied
from 21 to 59 months in duration and have averaged 39 months.
Annualized differences in ex post equity and bond returns over differ-
ent phases of the business cycle have been compared.
6 For contractions,
the first and last 5 months (which overlap for contractions of less than 10
Table 3.3 Business Cycle Reference Dates:







































































Source: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Notes:
all months, excluding the Great Depression.
b39 months, excluding the World War II and Vietnam cycles.123 Debt and Equity Yields, 1926-1980
months duration) were examined. For expansions, the first, second,
third, and last 6 months were studied (the last two periods overlap during
the 21 month upswing in the late 1920s). The cycles were divided into the
1926-52 and 1953-80 subperiods, and means and standard deviations of
the differences in equity and bond returns were calculated for the 5
pre-1953 cycles, the 5Vi post-1952 cycles, and all 10V2 cycles. A cursory
examination of the data revealed that equities tend to earn a relatively
superior return (i.e., greater than the average 7% by which equity returns
exceeded bond returns throughout the entire 1926-80 period) late in
contractions and early in expansions and a relatively inferior return late
in expansions and early in contractions.
A systematic comparison of the return data is reported in table 3.4. We
first divided the months between January 1926 and December 1980 into
three types of periods: those around troughs (in which equity returns
appear to be superior), those around peaks (in which equity returns
appear to be relatively inferior), and the remainder. The inferior periods
are defined as the last 6 months of every expansion and the first half
(dropping fractions) or first 6 months, whichever is less, of every contrac-
tion. The superior periods are defined as the last half (dropping fractions)
or last 6 months, whichever is less, of every contraction and the first 6
months of every expansion. In the second step in this comparison, the
total 1926-80 period is partitioned into 11 overlapping intervals that
contain single adjoining peaks and troughs and all the surrounding
months that do not overlap with adjacent superior and inferior periods.
That is, the intervals extend from 6 months after a trough to 6 months
before the second following peak. These 11 overlapping intervals are
listed at the left in table 3.4. Also listed are the geometric mean returns
(annualized) during the superior periods within the interval, the inferior
periods, and all months excluding such periods. The mean in the latter
months is the "normal" return to which the mean returns around the
trough and peak are compared.
7
Columns 4 and 5 are the differences between the superior and inferior
returns, respectively, and the normal returns. The extraordinary annual
net returns on equities around troughs average 26% (no net return is less
than 18%), and the standard deviation is only 11%. In contrast, the
extraordinary annual net returns on equities are negative around most
peaks, and these net returns average —13%. Here, however, the stan-
dard deviation is a relatively large 17%.
These results indicate that investors could devise superior trading
schemes involving transactions between equities and government bonds
to the extent that they were able to forecast the turning points of business
cycles, particularly the recession trough. Given the brevity of the post-
World War II recessions, this would not appear to be difficult; when a
recession is clearly upon us, the trough is just around the corner. Unfor-124 Patric H. Hendershott/Roger D. Huang
Table 3.4 Geometric Difference between Returns on Equities and Treasury
Bonds, Near Troughs, Near Peaks, and in Other Periods (%)
Excess Excess
Near Near Other Near Near



















































































aCovers the period May 1980-December 1980.
bCovers the period August 1979-April 1980.
cCovers the period October 1975-July 1979.
tunately, such a trading rule will lead to incredibly negative returns if the
early 1930s are ever repeated.
3.2 Ex Post Returns and the Interest Rate and Business Cycles
Our next task is to explain ex post monthly returns on corporate bonds
and equities. The analytical framework, which follows Mishkin (1978,
1981), is first developed and then empirical results for bonds and equities
are reported.
3.2.1 The Analytical Framework
The ex post after-tax return on an asset equals the expected or required
return plus the difference between the ex post and expected returns. With
the required return equal to the after-tax return on one-month Treasury
bills plus a risk/liquidity premium, we have
(1) (1 - T'")*/+1 = (1 - T)*,+ t + p'" + UNEX/+!,
where p
; is the premium required on the yth asset and UNEXf+1 is the
difference between the ex post and anticipated after-tax return on asset;
that occurs because of unexpected changes in variables relevant to the125 Debt and Equity Yields, 1926-1980
return on asset/. Next p
j and UNEX,+1 are replaced by a constant plus a
set of responses to proxies for them (Xj) and an error term (V) to obtain
(2) Rf+1 = M + £{Rt+i + % p/4+1 + T,/+1 , ii = 2
where Pi = (1 — T)/(1 - T
;). The difficult problem is, of course,
specification of the X-s.
Unanticipated Changes in Treasury Coupons. In section 3.2, it was sug-
gested that changes in new-issue-equivalent 20-year Treasury bond yields
have been largely unanticipated during the 1952-80 period. This proposi-
tion can be tested with data compiled by Huston McCulloch. For the
1947-mid-1977 period, McCulloch (1977) has meticulously constructed
monthly series for both (1) new-issue-equivalent (par value) long-term
Treasury bond yields and (2) cumulative unanticipated changes in these
yields.
8 A regression of the monthly change in the 20-year new-issue yield
(AR20) on the unanticipated change (UNA) over the January 1953-June
1977 period results in
AR20 = 1.27 + .999 UNA, R
2 = .882, D-W = 2.88,
(.34) (.021) SEE = 5.9 basis points,
where the yields are at annual rates. The positive constant reflects the
generally upward slope of yield curves, and the response to unanticipated
changes is clearly one for one. The adjusted R
2 indicates that 88% of
monthly changes other than the constant are explained by the unantici-
pated change.
In equation estimates reported below, variables based on both AR20
and UN will be employed (the latter in equations excluding data after
June 1977). The specific form of the variables depends on how an unex-
pected change in the bond rate should affect the price of (capital gain on)
the specific security being analyzed. The percentage capital gain on a
portfolio of n-year bonds (CGb) is related to changes in the yield on the
«-year bond, ARn, by
CG _ ARn[(l + Rn)
n-l]
b Rn(i + Rny
In the regressions reported below, n is set equal to 20. With CGb defined
in this way, its coefficient is expected to be near unity.
For equities, the relationship between the capital gain component of
the yield and the unanticipated change in the new-issue coupon rate is
more complicated. The perpetual dividend growth valuation model says
that the value of equities (V) equals current after-tax dividends [(1 —
jd)D] divided by the required after-tax nominal return on equities (/?")
less the expected rate of appreciation in dividends (g):126 Patric H. Hendershott/Roger D. Huang
(3) v=(l-Td)D
K-g
Taking derivatives, the percentage capital gain on equities, dVIV, is





The issues are, How should R
ae — g be measured, and what is the likely
value of the derivative of R
ae - g?
Portfolio equilibrium requires that
(4) R
ae = (l-jd)R20 + p,
where bonds and dividends are assumed to be taxed equivalently and p is
a required risk premium. Thus
and
dg
T m 1 T
dR20 dR20'
Equation (4') suggests the following. First, if all changes in R20 are due
to changes in expected inflation which are, in turn, reflected ing(dg/dR20
= 1), then d(R
ae - g)/dR20 equals - 7d and CGe is positive. Second, for
low values of rd, R
ae — g is roughly constant. This joint hypothesis
suggests the use of AT?20/0.06 as a regressor, with an expected positive
coefficient of id? On the other hand, if x percent of changes in /?20 are
due to changes in the real rate of interest and thus dg/dR20 = 1 — x, then
the coefficient on the regressor would be - (x - jd). Ideally, one would
separate changes in interest rates into nominal and real components and
enter these in the regressions separately. Such a separation of monthly
changes would seem to be nearly impossible and is not attempted here.
An alternative view of equity valuation exists. Equation (4) assumes
that investors rationally compare nominal returns on debt and equities.
In contrast, Modigliani and Cohn (1979) have contended that investors
compare real equity returns with nominal debt returns and that this error
has been the cause of the dismal performance of equities during the
1966-80 period of rising inflation. To test this hypothesis, (4) is replaced
with
(4a) R
ae - 77 = (1 - Trf)fl20 + p .
In this case127 Debt and Equity Yields, 1926-1980
Taking derivatives,
(4a,} djBZg) _ _Jg_ + J*_^ v dR2ti dR20 dR20
If Modigliani and Cohn are correct, then the appropriate regressor is
A/?20/[(l - Td)R20 + .04]—we take the real component of g to be
0.02—and the expected coefficient is —(1 — Td). Whether changes in
interest rates are perceived to be real or nominal is irrelevant (g and IT
change equally in any event) to investors and thus to equity prices, In the
empirical work reported below, both the rational and Modigliani and
Cohn views will be tested. In these tests, we shall set jd = 0.3 (see n. 17
for results with other values of Td).
Of course, fl20/.06 and R20/[(l - 7d)R20 + .04] are closely corre-
lated, being dominated by their numerators. Thus, if one "works," so will
the other. If neither works, then we will accept the rationality hypothesis
with x = rd. If both work positively, then the Modigliani-Cohn hypoth-
eses will be rejected. If both work negatively, we will choose between the
rationality and Modigliani-Cohn hypotheses on the basis of the plausibil-
ity of the implied estimates of x and jd.
Other Variables. In section 3.1.3, it was established that equities earned
extraordinarily large returns relative to bonds around recession troughs,
very likely because of a turnaround in expectations regarding the growth
of the economy. We would expect this to generate capital appreciation on
equities and possibly bonds (if default premia decline). Based on the




1 last half (dropping fractions) or last 6 months,
whichever is less, of every contraction and first
6 months of every expansion
0 elsewhere.
A final proxy is unexpected inflation. This variable is measured as the
difference between actual and expected inflation where the latter is based
on the Livingston survey data.
1
1 More specifically, the variable is the
difference between the actual average monthly inflation rate between the
survey date and the date forecast and the Livingston forecasted 6-month
inflation rate converted to a monthly basis. Because the forecasts are
available only semiannually, our proxy changes value only every 6
months.
1
2 Because price surprises appear to lead declines in real economic
activity—there is a strong negative correlation between our unantici-
pated inflation variable and the growth rate of industrial production in
the following year—the surprises should be expected to depress equity
returns (and possibly bond returns if default premia rise).
1
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3.2.2 The Results for Bonds
The results for corporate bonds are reported in table 3.5. Equations
(Tl) and (T2) are for the 1953-mid-1977 period and differ only in that
(Tl) includes the capital gains variable based on the unexpected change
in the 20-year Treasury rate as a regressor while the variable in (T2) is
based on the total change.
1
4 Given our earlier evidence that changes in the
20-year rate are largely unanticipated, it is not surprising that the results
are quite similar. The bill rate coefficients are close to their expected
value of unity. On the other hand, the capital gain coefficients are only
about 70% of their expected unity value. The unanticipated inflation and
superior dummy variables enter with the expected signs, but only the
coefficient on the former is significantly different from zero at the .05
level.
Equation (T3) contains estimates for the entire 1953-80 period. The
coefficient on the bill rate is now quite close to the expected unity value,
and the explanatory power of the equation increases sharply (R
2 rises
from .56 to .68). The coefficient on the capital gain variable, .76, is closer
to unity, but still significantly below, and the other coefficients, while
continuing to have the expected signs, are not significantly different from
zero. These coefficients are not small, however. Bond returns tend to be
2.3% less than normal in a year of 2.5% unanticipated inflation and 2.3%
more in the year surrounding business cycle troughs.
3.2.3 The Results for Equities
Hendershott and Van Home (1973, pp. 304-5) observed that the
new-issue bond yield and Standard and Poor's dividend-price ratio
moved in opposite directions throughout the 1950s (they conjectured that
a sharp decline in the relative risk premium required on equities oc-
curred) but were positively correlated in the 1960s and early 1970s.
Consequently, the 1953-80 period is divided into the 1953-60 and 1961-
80 subperiods and results are reported for these.
Equation (Tl) in table 3.6 illustrates the familiar, but hardly explica-
ble, result that ex post equity returns were strongly negatively correlated
with expected inflation in the 1950s.
1
5 The point estimate is an astounding
-16, indicating that a one-percentage-point increase in the bill rate
(expected inflation?) induced a 16-percentage-point decline in equity
returns. Equation (T2) indicates the expected negative relationship with
our unanticipated inflation variable (the average monthly inflation rate
between the date the Livingston survey was taken and the date forecast
less the Livingston forecasted 6-month inflation rate) and positive rela-
tionship with the turnaround cycle dummy variable, but neither rela-
tionship is statistically significant. Equations (T3) and (T4) include cur-
rent and lagged one-month values of the variables based upon changes in
the long-term Treasury coupon rate. The variables in equations (T3) and
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R20 + 0.04); the variables in equations (T4) and (T6) are the real rate
versions defined as Ai?20/0.06. A one-month lag was tested because
equities and new-issue bonds are not as close substitutes as are corporate
and Treasury bonds. Recall that the coefficients in (T3) are expected to
be negative and sum to -0.7 if investors make the Modigliani-Cohn
valuation error (and the tax rate on dividends is 0.3), and the coefficients
in (T4) can be interpreted as — (x — id), where x is the portion of changes
in R20 due to changes in real coupon rates and jd is the tax rate on
dividends. A positive relation between equity returns and the concurrent
change in the bond yield is indicated, although the effect is largely
reversed the following month.
1
6 This is inconsistent with the Modigli-
ani-Cohn hypothesis and supports the rationality hypothesis. The implied
dividend tax rate, assuming that changes in interest rates are perceived as
nominal (x = 0), is 0.1 (when the lagged term is taken into account) to
0.36.
While the bill rate coefficient is still a startling - 8 in equations (T3)
and (T4), it is not significantly different from the expected unity value. In
equations (T5) and (T6) this coefficient has been constrained to unity. As
anticipated, the decline in explanatory power is minor. The impact of
changes in Treasury coupon rates is unchanged from equations (T3) and
(T4), but the coefficients on unanticipated inflation and the turnaround
dummy rise in absolute value and statistical significance (the ^-ratios are
IV2 and 3, respectively).
Equations for the 1961—80 period are listed in table 3.7. While the
Treasury bill rate enters negatively in equation (Tl), the coefficient is
only a tenth as large as that in equation (Tl) of table 3.6. Moreover, when
unanticipated inflation and the turnaround dummy variable are included,
the bill rate coefficient is close (given its standard error) to unity. The
coefficients on unanticipated inflation and the turnaround dummy have
the expected signs and are significantly different from zero. Equations
(T3) and (T4) contain the change in coupon rate variables. The coeffi-
cients in equation (T3) sum to —0.6, very close to the expected value of
— 0.7 in the Modigliani-Cohn framework (further lagged values of the
variable have essentially zero coefficients), and the variables add substan-
tially to the explanatory power of equation (T2).
1
7 The coefficients in
equation (T4) sum to - 0.33, implying that most of changes in long-term
coupon rates (one-third plus the dividend tax rate) have been perceived
by rational investors (not Modigliani-Cohn investors) as changes in real
rates. The rationality of this perception, during a period of rising infla-
tion, is questionable.
When the bill rate coefficient is constrained to unity (see eq. [T5] and
[T6]), the other coefficients are little affected except for that on unantici-
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standard error falls proportionately, the statistical significance of the
coefficient is unaltered.
Comparisons of equations (T5) and (T6) in table 3.6 with their counter-
parts in table 3.7 indicates a close similarity of all coefficients except those
on the current change in the Treasury coupon rate. Given this similarity,
equations for the entire 1953-80 period have been estimated and are
reported as equations (Tl) and (T2) in table 3.8. The estimates are, of
course, close to those of the subperiods. The coefficients in equation (T2)
can be interpreted in the following way. First, the constant term, which is
0.102 on an annual basis, represents Merton's excess expected return on
the market. Second, the bill rate contributed an average 4V2% return
over the period, rising steadily from under 2% in the early 1950s to over
10% in 1979-80. Third, the continuing ciimb in the Treasury coupon rate
lowered stock returns by nearly 2% per annum on average during the
1953-80 period. More important, the change in this rate has had large
impacts in particular years. To illustrate, the percentage increase in the
coupon rate from 9% to 12^2% between March 1979 and March 1980
generated a 15% ex post decline in stock returns in that year, other things
being equal. Fourth, the coefficient on the turnaround dummy variable
suggests that equities have earned a 34% greater return in the year
roughly surrounding business cycle troughs than during other periods.
Fifth, stocks have earned sharply negative returns, ceteris paribus, during
periods of unanticipated inflation. More specifically, the roughly 4V2
percentage point unanticipated inflation in 1973-74 and 1979 translates
into a 22% lower annual return on equities than would otherwise be the
case. Our interpretation of this negative relation between equity returns
and unanticipated inflation is that the latter generates expectations of




It is well known that equity returns follow a strong political cycle. For
example, during the 1953-80 period equity returns averaged 3¥z% in the
2 years following presidential elections, but 20% in the 2 years leading up
to the elections. Because the political cycle is so readily predictable, such
differences in returns must certainly be attributable to other factors
which, it just happens, have been correlated with the business cycle in the
past but might well not be in the future. Likely candidates for these other
factors are the interest rate and business cycles as reflected in our change-
in-coupon, turnaround, and unanticipated inflation variables. To deter-
mine whether our equations have captured the observed political cycle
impact, we have computed the annual errors from equation (T2) in table
3.8 and averaged them over the first and second pairs of years of presiden-
tial terms. Much to our surprise, the difference in these averages was a
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average difference in average returns between the 2 years preceding
presidential elections and the 2 following years.
The last two equations in table 3.8 include political cycle dummy
variables that equal one in months which fall in the second/third/fourth
year of presidential terms and zero in all other months. As can be seen,
their inclusion raises the explanatory power of the equations. Moreover,
the hypothesis that the coefficients on the three political-cycle dummy
variables are jointly zero can be rejected at the .05 level. Inclusion of
these variables does not affect the interest rate coefficients, but it does
alter the others by one-half (the turnaround dummy and the constant
terms) to a full (unanticipated inflation) standard error.
1
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3.3 Treasury Bill Returns and the Inflation Rate
3.3.1 Theory
Definitionally, the real rate of interest is the nominal interest rate less
the inflation rate. If we let rt+l and Rt+1 be the real and nominal interest
rates earned over the holding period t to t + 1, respectively, and It + x be
the inflation rate over the same time span, then
(5) rt+1 = Rt+1 - I, t+i
Taking expectations of both sides of (5) contingent on information avail-
able at t, so that expectations are formed rationally, (5) becomes
(6) trt+1 = Rt+1-t7:t+1,
where trt+1 is the real rate expected at time t to exist in period t + 1, tirt+l is the inflation rate expected at time t to exist in period t + 1, and (6)
utilizes the fact that the expected nominal interest rate is the ex post rate
because Rt + x is known at time t. In a world where lenders are required to
pay an income tax rate T on their nominal interest receipts and borrowers
can deduct T percent of their nominal interest payments,
(6a) tf+1 = (1 - r)Rt + x - ,<*,+1,
where trf+x is the expected after-tax real short-term rate.
The expected inflation rate is the difference between actual and unan-
ticipated inflation: {nt+1 = It+X - UNINFr+1. With this substitution in
(6a), one can obtain
(7) It+1 = trt+1 + (1 - r)Rt+1 + UNINF, + r.
If the expected after-tax real short-term rate and T are constants and the
unanticipated rate of inflation is white noise, then it is appropriate to
regress It+1 on Rt+i and a constant. The equation is estimated with
inflation as the dependent variable and the interest rate as the indepen-136 Patric H. Hendershott/Roger D. Huang
dent because the latter is predetermined while the former develops
during the period. Unfortunately, a large body of evidence rejects the
assumption of a constant real rate (see Garbade and Wachtel 1978;
Mishkin 1981 and references cited in the latter), and the Livingston
inflation survey data indicate systematic inflation forecast errors. The
purposes of our estimation are to provide evidence on the determinants
of the real short-term rate and to test for the presence of systematic errors
in inflation forecasts.
3.3.2 Problems with the Inflation and Interest Rate Data
Fama (1975) regressed inflation on the bill rate on data from the
January 1953-July 1971 period. He ruled out the data from World War II
and its aftermath owing both to the low quality of the CPI prior to 1953
and to the Federal Reserve's pegging of nominal interest rates. Given
constant nominal rates and highly variable inflation, the real bill rate
varied widely. Our earlier examination of the 1926-39 period suggests
that there, too, nominal bill rates were relatively stable (near zero in the
1930s) and real bill rates relatively volatile. Thus we also restrict
ourselves to the post-1952 data.
Fama did not extend his analysis beyond July 1971 because the CPI was
contaminated beginning in August 1971 by the Nixon price controls.
Because "true" inflation is relevant to the nominal bill rate, regressions
of recorded inflation on the nominal bill rate may give misleading results
when true and recorded inflation rates differ. Subsequently, many inves-
tigators, including Fama, have proceeded to analyze data from the con-
trol period with no adjustments. In order to utilize post-July 1971 data in
our tests, we include a proxy for the difference between recorded and
true inflation in our regressions. In constructing this proxy, we utilize the
results of Blinder and Newton (1981). More specifically, we use the
change in their Model 1 measure of the impact of the controls on the
nonfood, nonenergy consumer price index as our proxy for the difference
between recorded and true inflation.
2
0 Their results suggest that the
controls reduced the price level by 3 percentage points by early 1974, a
reduction which was completely offset when the controls were lifted in
1974.
A more general problem with the consumer price index is the treat-
ment of housing costs (especially mortgage interest) in the construction of
the index (see Blinder 1980; Dougherty and Van Order 1982). To circum-
vent this problem, the inflation rate employed in this paper is the con-
sumer price index net of the shelter component. Such an adjustment is
particularly important in analyzing data after 1978.
A final possible data problem follows from a phenomenon documented
by Cook (1981). He notes that in 1973 and 1974 short-term bill rates
became far "out of line" relative to short-term rates on large CDs,137 Debt and Equity Yields, 1926-1980
commercial paper, and bankers acceptances. During this period market
interest rates rose sharply relative to ceiling-constrained yields on de-
posits. According to Cook, the bill market was segmented from markets
for private short-term securities. Because only bills were available in
smaller denominations, many households were able to shift deposit funds
only into bills. Corporations did not have sufficient bill holdings to
arbitrage between the bill and private security markets (they drew their
holdings down to zero in 1974), and commercial banks and municipalities
had nonyield reasons for maintaining bill holdings. Thus bill rates fell
relative to other yields. As a result, expected inflation was not fully
reflected in bill rates. In fact, the enormous disparity between private and
Treasury short-term yields in 1974 was the driving force behind the
creation of the money market fund, an entity that, in the absence of other
government regulations, should prevent such disparities from recurring.
2
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During the 156-month 1965-77 period, the spread between one-month
prime CDs and one-month Treasury bills was generally within the 30-80
basis point range.
2
2 Two major exceptions occurred. During the 20
months from April 1969 to November 1970, the spread exceeded 90 basis
points in 17 months and was at a maximum of 189 basis points in July
1969. During the 24 months from April 1973 to March 1975, the spread
exceeded 90 basis points in 23 months, the maximum being 431 basis
points in July 1974. In the 4 years prior to April 1969, the spread was
above 80 basis points in only 4 of 48 months and never exceeded 110 basis
points. In the 28 months between November 1970 and April 1973, the
spread exceeded 81 basis points only once (85 basis points in July 1972).
Finally, in the 39 months between April 1975 and June 1978, the spread
never exceeded 90 basis points.
In the empirical estimates, then, we specify the inflation rate as the CPI
net of shelter, the price control variable CONT is included in regressions
using data from the August 1971-December 1974 period, and both the
observed one-month Treasury bill rate and an adjusted rate that moves
with the CD rate when the bill rate is out of line are utilized as regressors.
3.3.3 The Estimates
Table 3.9 contains the regression coefficients (and their standard
errors, below them in parentheses), the coefficient of determination (and
the equation standard error, under it in parentheses), and Durbin-
Watson ratio for equations explaining the rate of change in the CPI net of
shelter over the January 1953-December 1980 span.
2
3 In the first two
equations, it is assumed that the real after-tax bill rate is either a constant
or a linear function of the nominal after-tax bill rate and unanticipated
inflation is white noise. As can be seen, the bill rate coefficient is signifi-
cantly above unity. This result is similar to that obtained by Fama and
Gibbons (1981, table 1) in their study of data from the 1953-77 period.O <N ©
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Because tax rates cannot be negative, this estimate implies that the
after-tax real bill rate is negatively related to expected inflation (and thus
to the after-tax nominal rate).
2
4 To illustrate, if /}+1 = a - prirr+1, then
the use of (6a) and the inflation identity (inflation is the sum of its
expected and unexpected components) yields
(8) It+1 = - -?— + ^—
LRt+1 + UNINFf+1.
1 — p 1 — P
The coefficient on the nominal rate will be greater than unity if (3 > T.
2
5 A
negative relation between real after-tax debt rates and expected inflation
is hardly surprising when the use of historic depreciation and FIFO
inventory accounting erodes after-tax real earnings of firms during
periods of rising inflation. Because firms are unable to pay constant real
after-tax returns to debtors and shareholders in the aggregate, the returns
to each would be expected to decline (Hendershott 1981, pp. 913-14).
Examination of the residuals from equation (T2) reveals that they tend
to be negative in the 1950s and 1960s and positive in the 1970s. That is, the
equation overpredicts inflation in the early years and underpredicts it
later. Two possible explanations come to mind. First, the real bill rate
may have fallen between the 1960s and 1970s by even more than is
captured by the high coefficient on the bill rate and the increase in this
rate. If real interest rates are positively correlated with real economic
activity, then the relatively sluggish activity in the 1970s would suggest a
decline in the real rate.
2
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Second, possibly more of the higher inflation in the 1970s was unantici-
pated than was the case in the 1950s and 1960s. Comparison of actual
6-month inflation rates with the forecasts computed from the Livingston
survey data suggests that this was the case (see Appendix C). Four
periods of prolonged unanticipated inflation (four consecutive large 6-
month forecasting errors) occurred: the four surveys from June 1956 to
December 1957, January 1969 to June 1970, January 1973 to June 1974,
and June 1978 to December 1979. Not only did two of these come during
the shorter period of large positive residuals, but the average degree of
unanticipated inflation was 4V2% (at an annual rate) in these two com-
pared to 2V2% for the earlier episodes.
Equation (T3) is the result of including a proxy for unanticipated
inflation. Of course, if the real bill rate were a constant and the proxy for
unanticipated inflation were perfect, then we would be estimating an
identity whose usefulness could be easily questioned. What is being
tested in equation (T3) is whether an unanticipated inflation variable
based on the Livingston survey data improves on the assumption of white
noise. The proxy enters with the anticipated positive sign and yields a
marked improvement in explanatory power. Moreover, the coefficient
on the bill rate is lowered below unity, although not significantly so.140 Patric H. Hendershott/Roger D. Huang
Equation (T3) is consistent with the joint hypotheses that the real Trea-
sury bill rate was constant during the 1953-80 period (at a 1.2% annual
rate) and that the Livingston survey data are slightly high estimates of
unanticipated inflation.
In equation (T4) we test the hypothesis that real bill rates are related to
real economic activity. As a proxy for real activity, we follow Carlson
(1979) and Hendershott and Hu (1981) in using the Federal Reserve's
capacity utilization rate for manufacturing. Because this rate is available
only quarterly, we assign this value to the middle month of the quarter
and interpolate linearly between mid-quarter months. This series, lagged
one month and divided by 100, less its mean value over the 1953-80
period of 0.834 is the regressor. This variable enters with the expected
negative sign and has a f-ratio of 3.
2
7 The coefficient on unanticipated
inflation rises to within a standard error of unity and that on the bill rate
falls to nearly two standard errors below unity.
2
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Fama and Gibbons (1981), among others, have provided evidence that
expected real bill returns behave like random walks. If this is true of real
bill returns even after allowing for their positive relationship with real
economic activity, then the nominal bill rate is correlated with the error
term and thus its estimated coefficient is biased downward. Equation
(T5) provides estimates of the other coefficients when that on the bill rate
is arbitrarily constrained to unity. The standard error of the equation
rises ever so slightly, and the coefficient on unanticipated inflation falls to
0.75. The adjusted R
2 indicates that one-sixth of the variation in inflation
after allowing for variations in the bill rate is explained by variations in
unanticipated inflation and capacity utilization.
To this point, the coefficient on the price controls variable has not been
discussed. In equation (T2), the coefficient is statistically different from
both its maximum plausible value of unity and its minimum plausible
value of zero. In subsequent equations, the coefficient is about 0.2 or only
one standard error from zero. Although the controls variable is nonzero
in only the August 1971-December 1974 period, its coefficient could
affect the coefficients on the other variables because all variables move
sharply in this period. To test this sensitivity, equation (T4) was rerun
with the controls coefficient arbitrarily constrained to unity. Equation
(T6) indicates that only the coefficient on unanticipated inflation is
affected, declining to 0.75.
Our last experiment tests an adjusted bill rate variable which takes into
account the fact that bill rates were out of line relative to private open
market rates during much of the April 1969-March 1975 period. In April
1975, the first month after bill rates returned to the normal relationship
with private rates, the one-month bill rate was 0.004347. The bill rate was
almost precisely the same in November 1968, shortly before it got out of
line. In this month, the one-month CD rate exceeded the bill rate by141 Debt and Equity Yields, 1926-1980
0.00047. The adjusted bill rate series is defined as the CD rate less
0.00047 during the November 1968-March 1975 period and the bill rate
otherwise. This adjusted series replaces the observed bill rate in equation
(T7). Relative to equation (T4), the coefficients on the price controls and
unanticipated inflation variables decline by a standard error, and the
explanatory power of the equation rises slightly.
3.3.4 Summary
Three findings should be emphasized. First, the existence of price
controls and out-of-line bill rates in the early and middle 1970s do not
have an important impact on the estimates. Inclusion of the price controls
variable or adjustment of the bill rate improve the explanation of infla-
tion slightly, but the values of the important regression coefficients are
largely unaffected.
Second, the real bill rate is shown to be systematically related to the
level of real activity as measured by the capacity utilization rate. With the
coefficient of the latter equal to -0.009, the real bill rate is 2
xh percen-
tage points higher (at an annual rate) when the utilization rate is 90%
than when it is 70%.
Third, the estimated responses of actual inflation to both expected
inflation (as reflected in the bill rate) and unanticipated inflation (based
on the Livingston survey data) are close to unity. The bill rate coefficient
point estimate is 0.85, while that of the unanticipated inflation varies
between 0.74 and 0.88. Although the lowest of these coefficients is two
standard errors below unity, we do not emphasize this because there is
reason to believe that the coefficients may be biased downward. Unfortu-
nately, the tax rate of the representative investor cannot necessarily be
inferred from the bill rate coefficient. For example, an estimate of unity
implies a zero tax rate if the real bill rate is independent of the expected
inflation rate, but a positive tax rate if the real bill rate is negatively
related to expected inflation, a relationship that would be reflected in the
estimated bill rate coefficient. The significance and empirical importance
of the unanticipated inflation measure suggest that the Livingston survey
data, which indicate a significant underestimate of 6-month inflation
throughout much of the 1969-80 period, may well have accurately
reflected the expectations of market participants. This underestimate of
expected inflation explains why nominal bill rates failed to move one for
one with actual inflation during the 1952-80 period.
3.4 The Determinants of Unanticipated Changes
in Treasury Coupon Rates
In section 3.2, ex post returns on corporate bonds and equities were
shown to be strongly influenced by unanticipated changes in long-term142 Patric H. Hendershott/Roger D. Huang
new-issue Treasury coupons (or by total changes which were shown to be
largely unanticipated). The last stage of our study is an investigation of
the determinants of these unanticipated changes.
2
9 We begin with the
analytical framework and then report some equation estimates.
3.4.1 Framework
Unanticipated changes in long-term Treasury rates are caused by
changes in long-run expected inflation, which are unanticipated by defini-
tion, and unanticipated changes in the long-term real rates. Of course,
neither of these is observable. Thus the problem is to specify proxies for
expected inflation and the expected real rate and, for the latter, to
distinguish between anticipated and unanticipated changes.
The results of sections 3.2 and 3.3 give us some guidance here. From
the Livingston survey, we have estimates of expected short-run inflation.
While the validity of this survey data is questioned by some, the empirical
significance of the measure of unanticipated inflation based on these data
in both the equity-return and inflation regressions suggests that the data
have empirical content. It seems reasonable that long-run inflationary
expectations would be revised upward in response to unanticipated short-
run inflation.
The inflation equations also implied that real Treasury bill rates are
related positively to the capacity utilization rate. Short-run changes in
this rate, in turn, must be closely correlated with the growth rate of
industrial production. As a consequence, it is reasonable to hypothesize
that unanticipated changes in long-term rates are positively correlated
with deviations between actual and expected growth rates in industrial
production. Fortunately, the Livingston survey also contains forecasts of
industrial production 6 months ahead.
Because the Livingston survey data are available only semiannually
(June and December), the analysis of unanticipated changes in Treasury
coupon rates is conducted in a 6-month time frame. That is, changes from
December of one year to June of the next, from that June to the next
December, and so on, are the dependent variable in the analysis (the
specific data are discussed and listed in Appendix C). We denote the
change from t — 1 to t as UN\. This change is hypothesized to depend on
unanticipated industrial production growth, UNIP, and unanticipated
inflation, UNINF,, between t - 1 and t. These variables are defined more
precisely as
t = [IPt-Et_1(IPt)]/IPt_l
where IP is the level of industrial production, / is the inflation rate (the
subscript t denotes inflation from t — 1 to t), and E is the expectations
operator.143 Debt and Equity Yields, 1926-1980
Policy surprises must also be accounted for because they may provide
information beyond that incorporated in the above defined variables.
This would likely be true to the extent that policy surprises affect prices
and real income with a lag; if the full impact occurred instantaneously, it
would be reflected in the unanticipated inflation and industrial produc-
tion growth variables. The most obvious surprise in the 1955-80 period
was the imposition and removal of price controls in the early 1970s. To
proxy this surprise, we specify a controls dummy variable that assumes
the value -1 in the second half of 1971 when the controls were imposed,
+1 in the first half of 1974 when the controls were removed, and zero in
all other periods. To the extent that the imposition and removal of
controls, respectively, lowered and raised expected long-run inflation,
this variable, PCDUM, should have a positive impact on the change in
coupon rate.
The fiscal surprise variable employed is that computed by von Fursten-
berg (1981). This variable is defined as the difference between the actual
and "normal" surpluses of federal, state, and local governments, di-
vided by net national product. The normal surplus takes into account not
only the stage of the business cycle but also regular (forecastable) discre-
tionary policy actions taken over the course of the business cycle (regular
tax cuts during recessions, for example). This variable is denoted by
FSUR. The variable exceeds l
x/2% in absolute value in only three
periods: 1960, mid-1966-mid-1968 (the Vietnam buildup), and the
second quarter of 1975 (the extraordinary tax rebate). A positive fiscal
surprise (unusually large surplus) would be expected to lower interest
rates. The decline would be relatively minor if the surprise does not lead
to a revision in the "fiscal policy" rule. Von Furstenberg argues per-
suasively that this was the case in the 1955-78 period.
The monetary surprise variable tested is the difference between the
rate of growth in the adjusted monetary base computed by the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis and the growth rate in recent periods (say the
previous 2 years). The impact of this variable on interest rates is unclear.
Unanticipated monetary growth would tend to depress real rates (Milton
Friedman's "liquidity effect") but would lead to an upward revision in the
inflation premia.
3
0 Because the estimated coefficient on variance of this
variable never had a f-ratio greater than one or an estimated impact
greater than a few basis points, equation estimates with this variable are
not reported below.
We would expect that the coupon rate would be linearly related to the
unanticipated inflation and price control variables as constructed. Be-
cause the unanticipated industrial production and fiscal surprise variables
are real ratios, we would expect them to affect the percentage change in
the new-issue coupon rate. To reflect these considerations, the unantici-
pated change in the coupon rate, unanticipated inflation, and the price144 Patric H. Hendershott/Roger D. Huang
controls variable have all been deflated by the lagged value of the 20-year
Treasury coupon rate. Thus the estimated equations are of the form:
(9) UN\/R20_ i = 0O + e^NIP + 02UNINF/fl2O_ x - 83FSUR
+ 64PCDUMAR20_1,
where 0O ~ 0 and 0, > 0 for i > 0.
3.4.2 The Estimates
The first equation in table 3.10 is estimated over the 1955-78 period,
the span for which von Furstenberg calculated his fiscal surprise variable.
All variables enter significantly with the expected signs, the constant term
is within a standard error of zero, and the equation explains a third of the
variance in the dependent variable. The sources of the cumulated 6
percentage point rise in the new issue coupon rate over the 1955-78
period are unanticipated 6-month inflation and industrial production
growth; both averaged 1.3 percentage points per period in this span.
Multiplication of 1.3 by 48 semiannual periods and the relevant regres-
sion coefficient yields 3.3 percentage points for the cumulative effect of
unanticipated inflation. To obtain the impact of unanticipated industrial
production growth, we multiply 1.3 by 48, the regression coefficient
(.0082), and the mean value of the 20-year Treasury coupon in this
period, 5.4. The result is 2.8 percentage points. A single AVz percentage
point inflation error, which occurred during 1973-74 and again in 1979, is
accompanied by a quarter of a percentage point rise in the coupon rate.
The production growth forecasting errors exceeded ±0.06 in six semi-
annual periods between 1955 and 1978 but were never larger than
± 0.092; the 0.0082 coefficient implies that a 0.08 underforecast of indus-
trial production growth is associated with a two-thirds percentage point
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aThe dependent variable, unanticipated inflation, and the price controls dummy are de-
flated by the beginning-of-period, 20-year, new-issue coupon rate.145 Debt and Equity Yields, 1926-1980
large negative fiscal surprise, such as the 2
xh percentage point surprise
during the mid-1966-mid-1968 Vietnam buildup, is accompanied by a 15
basis point per period rise in the coupon rate. Finally, the imposition of
price controls appears to have lowered long-run inflation expectations by
nearly two-thirds of a percentage point.
The second equation in table 3.10 contains estimates for the full
1955-80 period. In this equation the fiscal surprise variable was arbi-
trarily set equal to zero (the variable was 0.404 in the fourth quarter of
1978 and averaged -0.187 during the 1955-78 period). Beause there
were not any obvious surprises in the last 2 years of the Carter administra-
tion, this is probably a reasonable approximation. The estimated coeffi-
cients are close to those of the first equation with the exception of the
response to unanticipated growth which rises by half a standard error.
The actual and predicted percentage changes from this equation are
plotted in figure 3.2. As can be seen, the equation seems to underpredict
a number of large changes (except those associated with price controls)
but does capture major swings in the new issue coupon (except possibly
the most recent one).
With the fiscal surprise variable still maintained at zero, our equation
significantly overpredicts the level of the Treasury coupon rate in 1981
and 1982, even allowing for the sharp decline in late 1982. This is to be
expected for two reasons. First, a substantial fiscal surprise has un-
doubtedly occurred. While taxes are normally cut during recessions and
the 1982 full employment deficit is not large by historical standards, the
combination of the July 1983 tax cut, the indexation of taxes in future
years, and the difficulties of controlling many expenditures leads to large
"out year" full employment deficits. This "permanent" surprise could
have had a quite large impact on interest rates. Second, the sharp 1981 cut
in the taxation of returns from business capital would be expected to raise
real interest rates by a percentage point or two (Hendershott and Shilling
1982).
3.5 Summary
This study began with an examination of data for the 1926-80 period
on returns earned on one-month Treasury bills, long-term Treasury and
corporate bonds, and corporate equities. Relationships among the re-
turns and between them and inflation and the business cycle were iden-
tified. We then turned to econometric investigations of the relationships
between ex post monthly returns on corporate securities and bill rates
and other variables, principally the unanticipated change in the coupon
on new-issue Treasury bonds. We concluded with an investigation of the
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The most general theme of the econometric work is the usefulness of
the Livingston survey data in explaining financial returns. Unanticipated
inflation, defined as the difference between short-run observed inflation
and the Livingston forecast, enters the equity-returns, inflation-rate, and
change-in-new-issue-coupon equations significantly. (When unantici-
pated inflation is not included as a regressor in the inflation equation, the
estimates imply that real [bill] interest rates are negatively related to
expected inflation; when unanticipated inflation is included this negative
relationship does not appear to exist.) In addition, changes in new-issue
coupon rates are positively related to unanticipated growth in industrial
production, defined as the difference between observed growth and the
Livingston forecast.
The latter result is part of a secondary theme, a positive relationship
between real interest rates or returns and real economic activity. Ex post
equity returns ("the market") are strongly related to expectations of
future economic activity. In every business cycle since at least 1926, the
market has risen sharply around cycle troughs (the last half or 6 months,
whichever is shorter, of recessions and first 6 months of expansions);
other things being equal, equity returns are 34 percentage points higher
during this key year of turnaround in expectations than these returns are
at other times. In addition, unanticipated inflation, which appears to lead
to expectations of lower real economic activity, depresses equity values
(by as much as 22% in 1973-74 and 1979), other things being equal. The
investigation of new-issue debt yields lends supporting results. The real
Treasury bill rate is positively related to the capacity utilization rate with
the real rate being 2
xh percentage points higher when utilization is at 90%
than when it is at 70%. Because more rapid growth in industrial produc-
tion leads to higher capacity utilization, the relationship between changes
in new issue rates on long-term Treasuries and this growth is implicitly a
relationship between the level of Treasury bond rates and capacity uti-
lization.
Unanticipated changes in new Treasury coupon rates (and 88% of
monthly changes during the 1953-77 period were unanticipated) are the
dominant determinant of ex post monthly coporate bond returns and also
strongly influence equity returns. Regarding the latter, a 2
xh percentage
point increase in new-issue Treasury coupon rates is estimated to lower
the market by 10%. More generally, for the 1961-80 period the data are
consistent with the Modigliani-Cohn valuation error model and a div-
idend tax rate of about 0.4. Finally, a third of semiannual percentage
unanticipated changes in new-issue coupon rates over the 1955-80 period
can be explained by unanticipated 6-month inflation and industrial pro-
duction growth, fiscal policy "surprises," and the imposition and removal
of price controls in the early 1970s.148 Patric H. Hendershott/Roger D. Huang
The analysis of the present study can usefully be extended in two ways.
First, a switch to a semiannual data base for all parts of the empirical work
is called for in order to utilize the Livingston survey data more appro-
priately. This switch might also allow some differentiation in the effects
of real and purely nominal unanticipated bond rate changes on equity
returns. Our analysis was not able to distinguish between Modigli-
ani-Cohn irrationality (there is no need to differentiate between changes
in real rates and in inflationary premia because investors only care about
their sum) and rationality (with much of nominal rate changes being real
changes) because it is nearly impossible to identify inflationary premia in
long-term bond rates on a monthly basis. Second, the stability of the
estimated relationships over time should be tested. It would, of course,
be useful to know if the relationships have been altered by the change in
Federal Reserve operating procedures and the resulting increased volatil-
ity in financial markets since October 1979. Preliminary examination of




The purpose of this Appendix is to investigate the information content
of past returns on bonds (equities) in determining equity (bond) yields
after accounting for past yields on equities (bonds). The role of the
inflation rate is examined in this context both by introducing it as a
determining factor for asset yields and by comparing the behavior of
nominal and real asset yields.
The statistical tool we use here corresponds to a statistical test for
exogeneity commonly known as the Granger causality test. It should be
emphasized that the word 'causality' is used here only in the restrictive
sense of predictability. More specifically, we say that a time series Xt
Granger causes another time series Yt if we are able to better predict Yt in
the sense of a lower mean squared prediction error by using the past
values of both Xt and Yt than by employing only the past values of Yt.
Specifying the predictor to be a linear one, the test involves regressing
Yt on lagged Y/s and X/s, that is,
(Al) Y,= X a,Y?_1+ I 3,Zf_,. i = \ i = \
If the parameters (3,, i — 1,. . . , k2, are significantly different from zero,
then Xt Granger causes or is informative in the prediction of Yt. In order
to test the predictive content of Y, in determining Xt, the roles of Yt and Xt
in (Al) are reversed.149 Debt and Eauity Yields, 1926-1980
If, contrary to (Al), the relevant information set contains variables
other than Xt and Yt, then the above regression test may show spurious
causality between Xt and Yt if the other variable leads both Xt and Yt. Given the results of the previous section, it is therefore highly probable
that a test of the predictive relationship between corporate bonds and
stocks will reveal Granger causality; the causality being the result of
shocks that are common to both stocks and bonds.
In our tests, we specify k1 = k2 = 6. It is felt that 6 months is long
enough to reflect any price adjustments. A constant term and time trend
are added to (Al) in the estimation to capture the presence of determinis-
tic components.
In table 3.A.I we report the results of the tests of the bivariate rela-
tionships between equity and debt returns. The overlapping sample





























































































































































Note: The following notations are used: CS for common stocks, CB for corporate bonds, TB
for Treasury bills. X and Y variables refer to the same variables in eq. (Al) in the text.
* Significant at the 5% level.150 Patric H. Hendershott/Roger D. Huang
Accord period 1926-52, the pre-Treasury Accord period after the Great
Depression 1933-52, and the post-Accord span of 1953-80. Reported
are the F-statistics for tests of the null hypothesis that all the (3's in (Al)
are zero. The tests are performed for both the nominal and real rates of
return.
With one exception, returns on government bonds or bills contain no
informative content in the prediction of equity returns. The reverse is
also supported. The sole exception is the informativeness of government
bonds in predicting stock returns during the post-Accord period. As for
common stocks and corporate bonds, the latter Granger-caused the





















































Granger Causality Tests with Past Inflation Included
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Note: The following notations are used: CS for common stocks, CB for corporate bonds, TB
for Treasury bills, and I is the inflation rate. Xand Y variables refer to the same variables in
eq. (Al) in the text.
* Significant at the 5% level.151 Debt and Equity Yields, 1926-1980
the entire sample are examined, the causality is in the opposite direction
with corporate bonds leading stocks for the 1926-52 period. When the
Depression years are excluded from the 1926-52 period, no causality in
either direction was observed. Finally, both equity and corporate bonds
appear to be valuable in predicting one another in the post-Accord
period. These observations are virtually unchanged whether real or
nominal returns are used.
In 3. A.2, we reexamine the results of table Al by focusing on nominal
returns but with past inflation rates (/,_r) added as a possible additional
source of information. The results indicate that past inflation rates by
themselves do not contain information content. Moreover, the same
conclusions drawn from table 3.A.I with respect to common stocks and
corporate bonds can be drawn from table 3.A.2 when the null hypothesis
tested is that both past Xt and /, have no informative content in predicting
Yt once one has accounted for past values of Yt. Also, as in table Al, in
general no distinct causal patterns emerges when government bonds or
bills are used in place of corporate bonds.
To summarize, the results indicate the usefulness, in the post-Accord
period, of past corporate bonds (stock) returns in predicting current
corporate stock (bond) returns even after allowing for the presence of
past corporate stock (bond) returns. This result is observed when either
nominal or real returns are used as well as when past inflation rates are
added as additional sources of information. As for government bonds or
bills when examined with stocks, no consistent lead or lag relationships
were uncovered. It may very well be that the Granger causalities
observed for corporate bonds and stocks are due to variables other than
the inflation rate that affect both the variables being examined.
Appendix B
The McCulloch Data
Our analysis of ex post bond and equity returns employed changes in
the long-term, new-issue-equivalent Treasury bond rate and the unantici-
pated change in this rate as regressors. Both of these variables have been
computed by Huston McCulloch (1975,1977) who developed a technique
of curve-fitting the term structure of interest rates from security prices so
as to determine implicit forward interest rates as precisely as possible. At
each point in time for which Treasury security prices are available, a
discount function is estimated, using a cubic spline tax-adjusted tech-
nique, to give the value at these points of a promise to repay a dollar at
alternative future dates. Before-tax equivalent instantaneous forward
rates, single payment yields, and par bond yields were calculated from152 Patric H. Hendershott/Roger D. Huang
the parameters of the spline discount curve for maturities sufficiently
close to allow linear interpolation to all desired intermediate points. The
tax adjustment was especially important in the late 1960s and early 1970s
when all long-term Treasury bonds were selling at substantial discounts
owing to effective restrictions against new issues between 1965 and 1973
and the sharp rise in interest rates after the mid-1960s (see Cook and
Hendershott 1978).
Except for tax-exempt and selected flower bonds (those whose prices
were determined by the flower bond characteristic), virtually all U.S.
Treasury bills, notes, and bonds have been analyzed monthly since
January 1974 (McCulloch updates the file a number of times per year).
The data presented in columns 4 and 3 of table 3.A.3 are the level and
change in the new-issue-equivalent semiannual coupon yields on 20-year
Treasury bonds or on the longest possible maturity computable with
McCulloch's technique. During the 1952-81 period the longest maturity
was below 19 years only in the 1970-72 period.
Column 2 of table 3.A.3 contains McCulloch's measure of unantici-
pated monthly changes in the longest-term Treasury rates, ignoring li-
quidity premia (McCulloch 1977, app. 3). This is the difference between
the one-month forward par bond yield and the observed corresponding
spot par bond yield one month later.
In our analysis of semiannual changes in long-term interest rates, we
have updated McCulloch's data on a semiannual basis. Here, we compute
the difference between 6-month forward par bond yields (b*) and the
observed corresponding spot par bond yield 6 months hence (.R20+1).
The unanticipated change (UNA) is thus UNA = R20+1 - b*, where b* is
the semiannual coupon rate that will make the value of a bond in 6
months, evaluated at the current term structure, just equal to par, dis-
counted to the present using the current term structure. To make the
calculations, we use as inputs McCulloch's semiannual coupons (y) on
6-month (0.5 years) and 20V
/2-year bonds and continuous single-point par
discount yields (d) on the same maturity bonds. First, the semiannual
coupons are converted to continuous equivalents
c = 2 1oge(l + v/2)
for maturities 0.5 and 20.5.







5d20.5]/c20_5 - [1 - e-°-
5d0.5]/co.5 "
Finally, this continuous yield is converted to a semiannual coupon
equivalent: b* = 2(e
b/2 - 1).
Unanticipated changes for the first half of 1977 (December 1976—153 Debt and Equity Yields, 1926-1980
average of beginning and end of month values—to June 1977) through
the first half of 1982 are listed in Appendix C.
The percentage changes in yields employed in the stock return equa-













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Unanticipated Inflation and Growth in
Industrial Production: The Semiannual Database
Livingston collects data in May and November each year on the ex-
pected levels of the consumer price index and industrial production in the
following December (for the May forecast) or the next June (for the
December forecast). The annualized anticipated inflation rate is then
computed from the difference between the forecasted price index and the
level when the forecast is made. These data have been kindly supplied by
Donald Mullineaux of the Philadelphia Federal Reserve Bank and have
been calculated following the procedure reported in Carlson (1977).157 Debt and Equity Yields, 1926-1980
Unanticipated industrial production growth between May and Decem-
ber, say, is computed as the difference between the actual December
level and that forecast for December in the previous May, all divided by
the May value. This series is multiplied by 100 to convert it to percentage
points. The actual or observed data were collected from issues of the
Business Conditions Digest and the Federal Reserve Bulletin. The first
published number was utilized and care was taken to maintain consist-
ency in base years in each calculation.
Unanticipated inflation is the difference between the actual inflation
rate between, say, May and December, and that forecasted in May. On
the assumption that the April consumer price index was known at the
time of the December forecast, the actual inflation rate was computed as
the compounded inflation between May and December and then annual-
ized and converted to percentage points. More precisely,
ACTINF = 100If n (1 + /,_,-) |- 1
where /is the monthly inflation rate. The unanticipated inflation variable
employed in the monthly inflation and equity returns equations is
obtained as (1 + UNINFA/100)
171
2 - 1.
The fiscal surprise variable is taken from von Furstenberg (1981, table
9, p. 373) for the 1955-78 period. It is the difference between the actual
and normal government surplus divided by net national product and
converted to percentage points by multiplication by 100. The difference is
the residual from a regression equation in which the percentage GNP
gap, the lagged change in the unemployment rate, and the difference
between actual and officially forecasted inflation rates are employed as
regressors. The second- and fourth- quarter values of the surprise vari-
able are used for the June and December data. For 1979 and 1980, this
variable has been arbitrarily set equal to zero.
For the December 1954-December 1976 period, the unanticipated
change in the new-issue Treasury coupon rate is taken from McCulloch's
data (see our table 3.A.3). In order to center the data at mid-June and
mid-December, the change during the second half of the year is defined
as one-half of the June 1-July 1 change plus the total change from July 1
to December 1 plus one-half the change from December 1 to January 1.
For the half-year periods since 1976, we have extended McCulloch's data
in the manner described in Appendix B.
The annualized 6-month inflation forecast (the 551 number refers to
the forecast for the second half of 1955 made in May), annualized
unanticipated inflation, unanticipated growth in industrial production
(not annualized), the fiscal surprise (percentage points of net national
product), the unanticipated change in the coupon rate, this change di-
vided by the beginning of period level of the new issue coupon, and the






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1. The variability in the real bill rate in the 1952-80 period would likely have been even
lower in the absence of deposit rate ceilings. More specifically, the large negative values in
1973 and 1974 are due to bill rates becoming "out of line" relative to private short-term
yields due to disintermediation.
2. The premium that equities earned over Treasury bills is similar to the extent that
returns on bonds and bills are roughly equal. As is indicated in the last column of table 3.2,
government bonds outperformed government bills by nearly 4 percentage points per annum
in the 1926-40 period, with the result that the equity premium over bills was significantly
greater than that over bonds. The reverse was true, although to a lesser degree, in the
1968-80 perod.
3. Nonetheless, many have attributed the poor performance of equities in the 1969-78
decade to increased inflation and/or uncertainty regarding inflation. Feldstein (1980) has
argued that biases in the tax law reduce share values in inflationary periods, while Modig-
liani and Cohn (1979) have attributed the reduction to an inflation-induced error of
investors. Malkiel (1979) has contended that increased uncertainty regarding future price
and government regulation changes has lowered share values by increasing the relative risk
premium demanded on equity investments. In contrast, one of us has argued that these
phenomena explain the relatively modest rise in promised new-issue debt yields (decline in
real after-tax yields) but not the sharp decline in share values (Hendershott 1981).
4. Shiller (1979) has suggested that changes in long-term bond coupon rates have been
largely unanticipated.
5. Huston McCulloch has constructed the unanticipated changes in long-term Treasury
coupon rates in the 1947-77 period. These data are discussed in Appendix B and are
employed in the econometric work in sees. 3.2 and 3.4.
6. This comparison is reported in Hendershott (1982).
7. The annualized geometric return over N periods on an asset earning R in period i is
[H7=i(i + Rd - ir
i2.
8. Both of these series are described in Appendix B.
9. We value (1 - Td)/?20 - g at zero and p at 0.06.160 Patric H. Hendershott/Roger D. Huang
10. Because there was also weak evidence that equities earned negative returns relative
to bonds around business cycle peaks, a negative turnaround dummy variable was denned
analogously to the positive one and tested. The coefficient on this variable was never near a
standard error from zero in any bond or equity equation.
11. The Livingston survey data have been questioned by Pearce (1979) on the grounds
that they are not "rational" and are less consistent with observed bill rates than are rational
inflation expectations. On the other hand, Mishkin (1981) is unsure that the Livingston data
are irrational, and Carlson (1981) makes a strong argument that "irrationality" might not be
surprising.
12. The precise series used equals (1. + UNINFA/100)
171
2 - 1, where UNINFA is from
the semiannual database listed in Appendix C.
13. When Carlson and Kling (1982) specify expected inflation from an ARIMA model
and test for lead or lags between unexpected inflation and real activity via bivariate
autoregressions, they, too, find price surprises leading real activity negatively.
14. The Durbin-Watson statistics for the equations in table 3.5 vary between 2.25 and
2.45.
15. See Bodie (1976), Jaffee and Mandelker (1976), Nelson (1976), and Fama and
Schwert (1977).
16. The Durbin-Watson statistics for the equity equations over the different time
periods vary between 1.95 and 2.15.
17. The equation might be interpreted as suggesting a higher tax rate on dividends; with
Ai?20/(.55 R20 + .04) as the regressor, the coefficients would sum to - .45. With A/?20/
(R20 + .04) as the regressor, the coefficients sum to —0.75.
18. There is an alternative interpretation. Because unanticipated inflation is greatest
precisely when oil shocks occurred, this variable may be capturing nothing more than the
negative impact on share values of the unexpected increase in energy prices. We will
attempt to distinguish between these two interpretations in future work.
19. The "true" constant term which abstracts from political cycle effects is obtained as
the sum of the coefficients on the political dummies and four times the estimated constant,
all divided by 4. For eqs. (T3) and (T4), the true constants are 0.0063 and 0.0059.
20. The data are from their table 2, p. 17.
21. The spread between private rates and bills could also be affected by changes in risk
and in the level of interest rates. The latter could matter because the income from private
securities is taxed at the state and local level while that from bills is not.
22. The CD rates are first of month data recorded by Salomon Brothers.
23. A Cochraine-Orcutt semidifference transformation—with a semidifference param-
eter of 0.15-0.25—lowers the equation standard error for all of the equations in table 3.9 but
hardly changes the coefficient estimates.
24. Thus the result is also consistent with Mishkin's findings (1981) for quarterly data
from the 1953-79 period. When the lagged inflation rate is added to eq. (6), the procedure
followed by Mishkin, the coefficient is 0.3 and the coefficient on the bill rate declines by a
similar amount.
25. For the derivation of a nonzero p from a structural model, see Melvin (1982).
26. The Federal Reserve's capacity utilization rate for manufacturing averaged 84.3%
during 1953-69 versus 81.4% for 1970-80. With a desired ratio of 90%, this is a 50%
increase in the shortfall.
27. The result differs from Mishkin (1981) who does not find a significant implied
relationship between real bill rates and either real GNP growth, the GNP gap, or the
unemployment rate.
28. When the lagged inflation rate is added to equation (T4), a coefficient of 0.18 is
estimated with a standard error of 0.05, and all other coefficients decline by roughly 18%.
That is, the result is consistent with a very short lagged response (18% after the first month)
to all variables.161 Debt and Equity Yields, 1926-1980
29. On the relationship among new-issue coupon rates on alternative long-term debt
instruments, see Cook and Hendershott (1978), Hendershott et al. (1982), and Van Home
(1978).
30. Melvin (1983) provides evidence that the liquidity and inflation effects exactly offset
6 months after an increase in monetary growth.
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Comment Jess Barry Yawitz
Patric Hendershott and Roger Huang have indeed undertaken a major
research effort in their paper, "Debt and Equity Yields: 1926-1980."
One cannot help but be impressed with this investigation of the return
performance of the two major sectors of the financial asset market over
nearly a half century. The paper has much to recommend it as a useful
first step and, not surprisingly, there is also considerable room for refine-
ments and improvements.
I am pleased to see that nearly all of my original criticisms have been
incorporated into the current version of Hendershott and Huang's paper.
As a result, my comments will be quite brief. Before proceeding, how-
ever, it may be useful to make explicit my major criticism of the Hender-
shott and Huang paper. I have a strong bias which argues for first
developing a set of hypotheses to explain asset returns and then recasting
these hypotheses into a testable model. While Hendershott and Huang
do attempt to motivate the importance of most of the variables used in
their empirical work, a single unifying model is not presented. As a
result, the Hendershott and Huang approach generally suffers from being
Jess Barry Yawitz is John E. Simon Professor of Finance and director of the Institute of
Banking and Financial Markets at Washington University and a research associate of the
NBER.164 Patric H. Hendershott/Roger D. Huang
too simplistic; they utilize numerous combinations of variables to explain
returns, yields, and yield changes without carefully specifying causal
relationships.
I suggest that a useful approach to modeling yield spreads and bond
returns is first to develop a pricing model. A bond can be viewed as a set
of individual financial assets, some of which benefit the borrower and
some of which benefit the lender. If a particular feature benefits the
borrower, such as a call option, the price of the bond is reduced. Simi-
larly, if the feature benefits the lender, as with a put or attached warrant,
the price is higher. When a specific price is observed on a bond, it is
apparent that the net value of all of the bond's characteristics is equal to
this price.
In the case of new issues, the coupon plays the role of the balancing
feature on the bond. Once all of the other characteristics are determined,
the coupon generally is set at the particular value that will allow the bond
to be sold at par. Since at issue the coupon rate is identical to the yield to
maturity, one cannot hope to explain yields without taking explicit
account of the other characteristics of the bond.
Hendershott and Huang begin by presenting summary statistics which
document the variability in real and nominal rates of return on stocks and
bonds over the last half century. The purpose of their paper "is to
increase our understanding of the determinants of these variations."
While Hendershott and Huang divide their paper into four broad parts, I
prefer to view the paper as (1) an exploratory analysis of bond and equity
data for the 1926-80 period and (2) an empirical analysis of those factors
which were important in determining rates of return on financial assets
after 1952.
Hendershott and Huang provide a useful structure in which to explore
the yield data compiled by Ibbotson and Sinquefield (1980). As Hender-
shott and Huang point out, "It makes good analytical sense to exam-
ine the data for any regularities without the imposition of too much
structure ..." By "breaking the data" at various points, Hendershott and
Huang are able to (1) document the increased volatility in real and
nominal bill rates from 1952-80 compared to 1926-51; (2) demonstrate
that the premium earned on equities over bonds has varied widely; and
(3) show that equities have offered extraordinary positive returns around
business cycle troughs and negative returns around peaks. I would strong-
ly recommend that this section of the Hendershott and Huang paper be
read by all those interested in studying the return performance of alterna-
tive financial assets.
The only econometric analysis performed in the first part of the paper is
a series of Granger causality tests applied to bill, bond, and equity
returns. Without going into detail, I would suggest that this question
needs to be considered in greater detail in light of the efficient market165 Debt and Equity Yields, 1926-1980
implications of Hendershott and Huang's findings that in several in-
stances lagged returns are important in explaining current returns.
At several points in their paper, Hendershott and Huang attempt to
provide empirical support for their hypothesis that changes in long-term
(20-year) bond yields have been unanticipated for the most part. This
question is addressed by regressing monthly changes in the 20-year
Treasury yield on unanticipated changes in this yield. Hendershott and
Huang interpret an R
2 of .88 as indicative of the fact that nearly 90% of
the changes in long-term bond yields were unanticipated over the period
in question. I would point out that the positive and significant constant
should be picking up the general upward drift in rates during the period.
Since the yield curve was also generally upward sloping, the constant is
capturing in part the anticipated increase in rates as evidenced in the
patterns of forward rates. I also submit that the conclusion that monthly
changes in 20-year yields are largely unanticipated is to be expected. A
20-year yield is simply an appropriate average of 240 one-month rates,
the current one-month spot rate and 239 one-month forward rates. The
expected 20-year yield one month hence contains all 239 forward rates
plus one new forward rate. If the period were even shorter than a month,
say a day, the expected change in the 20-year yield must be nearly zero.
My earlier point regarding the need for more formal modeling before
undertaking the empirical is evidenced in Hendershott and Huang's
analysis of the determinants of monthly realized returns on long-term
corporate bonds. Hendershott and Huang estimate several equations
using the bill rate, a capital gain variable, a business cycle dummy, and
unanticipated inflation. While it is possible to hypothesize how each of
the independent variables could affect corporate bond returns, Hender-
shott and Huang need to be more clear on the way that each might do so.
This is an instance in which a formal model of yield spreads would be
valuable.
In conclusion, let me restate my earlier opinion that this paper is an
important first step in what must be an ongoing line of research. It
remains for Hendershott and Huang and those of us conducting research
in this area to consider in greater detail the menu of questions raised in
this paper.